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Abstract 
 
Amongst a favorable economic environment, Ecuador’s exceptional oil revenues 
have bolstered fiscal accounts. Several legal changes have created or modified 
funds or accounts aimed at saving, earmarking, or using oil-related revenues. This 
paper discusses oil-related fiscal policies, stabilization funds, and options in 
Ecuador. It reviews existing schemes, describes fiscal trends and underlying 
vulnerabilities, and offers trends and prospects for the oil-related funds and fiscal 
accounts. Assessing the weaknesses of the fiscal stabilization framework, it offers 
suggestions for improving efficiency in the use of exceptional fiscal revenues. It 
calls for enforceable fiscal responsibility rules, an enhanced accountability for oil 
revenues and the budget process, market mechanisms to hedge against oil price 
volatility, and a strengthened planning and prioritization of public investment. 
 
JEL: E62 - Fiscal Policy, E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes, L71 - 
Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels, L78 - Government Policy, 
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ECUADOR: FISCAL STABILIZATION FUNDS AND PROSPECTS
1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ecuador has benefited in recent years from exceptional revenues arising from high oil 
prices and a favorable economic environment. This has allowed the country to post better than 
usual fiscal results, reduce public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), and 
boost public spending. Meanwhile, Ecuador adopted a formal dollarization scheme in January 
2000. In this context, as argued by Rigobón (2006), fiscal policy as an economic stabilization 
instrument has become even more critical in a country that has lost most margins of maneuver 
regarding monetary policy. 
Over the past five years, several funds or accounts have been created with the aim of 
saving, earmarking, or using oil-related and exceptional fiscal revenues for specific purposes. 
Several legal reforms have subsequently modified some of such funds or created new ones. 
Furthermore, the legal framework is rather cumbersome regarding the distribution and 
earmarking of oil and tax revenues, creating large rigidities in fiscal management. 
This paper discusses oil-related fiscal policies, stabilization funds, and options in 
Ecuador. Section II summarizes the current fiscal stabilization funds or schemes and their 
development and legal framework. Section III describes the fiscal trends in the country, the 
underlying vulnerabilities in connection with oil-related revenues, and trends and prospects for 
the oil-related funds and fiscal accounts. Finally, Section IV discusses the weaknesses of the 
current fiscal stabilization framework and oil-related funds. It offers some suggestions for 
improving efficiency in the use of exceptional fiscal revenues, in light of existing schemes in 
other countries and considerations of Ecuador’s political economy. 
                                                 
1 This paper summarizes the situation as of March 2007, when it was prepared. Subsequently, on April 2, 2008, 
Ecuador´s Constituent Assembly approved a law, called Ley Orgánica para la Recuperación del uso de los Recursos 
Petroleros del Estado y Racionalización Administrativa de los Procesos de Endeudamiento. The approved bill 
transfers all current and future resources from the oil funds discussed below (FEP and CEREPS) to the General 
Budget. The law also replaces the existing fiscal rules with the sole rule that current spending cannot be financed 
with revenues arising from public debt operations or oil exports.  
   6
 
II.  FISCAL STABILIZATION FUNDS 
Ecuador faced a severe macroeconomic and financial crisis in the late 1990s. Among 
several other causes, low international oil prices were an important factor behind the worsening 
of the fiscal accounts. Ecuadorian crude oil prices reached their lowest level in 1998 (US$9.2 per 
barrel annual average) and only recovered significantly in 2000. Following a decline in 2001, oil 
prices have since markedly recovered, reaching US$50.7 per barrel on average in 2006 (see 
Figure 1). 
The recovery of oil prices, combined with a favorable international environment and 
growth results, have helped to boost the fiscal accounts. The non-financial public sector (NFPS) 
balance, which posted large deficits in 1998 and 1999 (at 4.8 and 3.9 percent of GDP, 
respectively), has been in surplus for seven years in a row since 2000. Meanwhile, the central 
government balance has also posted improved balances since 2000, with moderate deficits in the 
range of 0 to 1 percent of GDP. 
 






















































Ecuadorian Crude Oil Price (right scale)
 
Source: Petroecuador and Central Bank of Ecuador. 
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The improved fiscal conditions, combined with some enhanced awareness of the 
importance of fiscal stability following the 1998-99 crisis, have led to the creation of several oil-
related fiscal funds since 2000. 
These funds include the Oil Stabilization Fund (Fondo de Estabilización Petrolera, FEP); 
the Stabilization Fund for Investment and Debt Reduction (Fondo de Estabilización, Inversión 
Social y Productiva y Reducción del Endeudamiento Público, FEIREP), subsequently replaced 
by the Special Account for Economic Reactivation (Cuenta Especial de la Reactivación 
Productiva y Social, del Desarrollo Científico-Tecnológico y de la Estabilización Fiscal, 
CEREPS); the Savings and Contingency Fund (Fondo de Ahorro y Contingencias, FAC); and the 
Energy and Hydrocarbon Investment Fund (Fondo Ecuatoriano de Inversión en los Sectores 
Energéticos e Hidrocarburíferos, FEISEH). This section reviews several aspects of the different 
funds, including legal issues, interrelations, and changes since their creation, as well as the legal 
framework for the distribution, earmarking, and accounting of oil-related revenues in Ecuador. 
 
II.1.  The Oil Stabilization Fund 
The Oil Stabilization Fund (FEP) was created through an omnibus bill on economic 
issues,
2 which was approved in March 2000. The bill was intended to boost the prospects for 
successful implementation of dollarization, which had been adopted two months earlier. The bill 
earmarks oil revenues above those initially included in the annual general budget for several 
purposes: (i) 45 percent goes to FEP; (ii) 35 percent for a special fund to build and maintain a 
road in the Amazonian oil-producing areas (the Troncal Amazónica), including through domestic 
and foreign credits to be collateralized with such fund; (iii) 10 percent to finance the national 
counterpart for development projects for the border provinces of Esmeraldas, Loja, Carchi, El 
Oro, and Galápagos; and (iv) 10 percent for capital spending for the police, to be used for 
equipment and institutional strengthening (of which at least half should be spent in the oil-
producing regions) for five years through 2005. After that date, half of the corresponding funds 
were to be used for FEP and the other half for the Troncal Amazónica. 
                                                 
2 The bill, called Ley para la Transformación Económica del Ecuador, was published in the Ecuadorian Official 
Registry on March 13, 2000. Regarding oil revenues, the law, in turn, modifies another law, the Ley Para la 
Reforma de las Finanzas Publicas, published in the Ecuadorian Official Registry on April 30, 1999.   8
In addition, non-oil revenues in excess of the budgeted levels also go to FEP. FEP can be 
used for liability-management operations and, for amounts up to half its stock, for spending 
related to emergency situations. 
Initially, the earmarking system involved a formal transfer throughout the year of the 
funds related to the Troncal Amazónica to a special account. The other two uses of the funds 
(border provinces and police) were channeled through the budget. Subsequently, the legal 
reforms creating FEIREP and then CEREPS (see below), as well as a legal opinion issued by the 
General Prosecutor in 2002, have modified the way in which FEP operates. Under theses new 
procedures, a “FEP to be liquidated” account is provisioned throughout the year, and funds can 
be withdrawn by the Treasury as advances over the end-year liquidation.
3 Once the fiscal year is 
closed, the account is liquidated—taking into consideration actual oil revenues, including oil 
exports and domestic sales of oil derivatives—among its beneficiaries, with the same shares 
explained below, except that the 45 percent now funds CEREPS (see below). 
An important consideration regarding the functioning of FEP is related to the large 
subsidies for oil derivative products in Ecuador. Consumer prices for most oil derivative 
products (including regular gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cooking gas) 
have been frozen since January 2003 at prices well below international market levels. As a result, 
these subsidies have represented a growing cost for the state, through booming oil derivative 
import costs. Thus, the budget revenues expected from the sale of oil derivative products have 
not materialized. Instead, in 2006, Petroecuador incurred import costs larger than the expected 
revenues, thus implying the need for the Treasury to repay such costs. The related expenditures 
can be imputed to FEP (because they represent a reduction in oil revenues, thus reducing the 
amount of FEP’s liquidation) or to FAC (see below). In 2006, for example, although the 
liquidation process was still ongoing, it seemed highly probable that the total amount of FEP 
income from other sources would not be enough to compensate for the costs of subsidies, which 
led to the need to use part of FAC for that purpose. 
                                                 
3 Specifically, the FEP-to-be-liquidated account receives the equivalent of the number of oil barrels produced 
multiplied by the difference between the actual oil prices minus the budgeted oil prices as a provision. Depending on 
several factors—including the volume and price of oil and related products, the domestic demand for oil derivatives, 
and accrued obligations between Petroecuador and other institutions regarding oil-related transactions—the system 
can imply an over or under-provisioning over time. Throughout the year, funds may also be withdrawn from the 
account by the Ministry of Finance to cover expenses. The year-end liquidation will help in netting out all these 
movements and may result in some liabilities between FEP and the Treasury, which can be compensated in the 
subsequent budget exercise.     9
 
II.2.  The Stabilization Fund for Social and Productive Investment and Debt Reduction 
Introduced by the Fiscal Responsibility Law in June 2002,
4 the Stabilization Fund for 
Social and Productive Investment and Debt Reduction (FEIREP) was created as a special trust 
fund, managed by the Central Bank. FEIREP collects the state revenues arising from heavy crude 
oil production (i.e., the crude oil transported through the Heavy Crude Oil Pipeline, OCP, 
operating since late 2003), 45 percent of oil revenues above those initially included in the annual 
general budget—the share that was previously earmarked for FEP— as well as any year-end 
central government fiscal surplus and the fund’s investment revenues. 
The FEIREP funds—to be registered in the budget but not to be considered current 
revenues, thus avoiding some earmarking—were expected to be used according to the following 
breakdown: (i) 70 percent for debt-buyback operations and debt payments to the Social Security 
Agency; (ii) 20 percent to stabilize oil revenues and for emergency spending, particularly for 
natural disasters, with a 2.5 percent of GDP ceiling for the stabilization fund; and (iii) 10 percent 
for education and health spending. In any case, the FEIREP funds could not be used for current 
spending. 
 
II.3.  The Special Account for Social and Productive Investment, Scientific Development, 
and Fiscal Stabilization 
Three years after its creation, FEIREP was replaced in July 2005 by the Special Account 
for Social and Productive Investment, Scientific Development, and Fiscal Stabilization 
(CEREPS).
5 The political argument behind the change was the need to direct a larger share of oil 
funds to social investments instead of debt repayments.  
CEREPS was created as a special and separate account in the budget (not as a trust 
fund).
6 It receives revenues from several sources, mostly those that previously went to FEIREP: 
state revenues arising from heavy crude oil production (i.e., oil with a density below 23 degrees 
                                                 
4 See the third title of the original version of the Ley Orgánica de Responsabilidad, Estabilización y Transparencia 
Fiscal, published in the Ecuadorian Official Registry on June 4, 2002. 
5 See the reforms to the Ley Orgánica de Responsabilidad, Estabilización y Transparencia Fiscal, published in the 
Ecuadorian Official Registry on July 27, 2005. 
6 See section III.2 for a more detailed discussion of the practical differences between a trust fund and a separate 
budget account.   10
for API gravity); 45 percent of oil revenues above those initially included in the annual general 
budget—after deductions for earmarked revenues directed by law to regional funds—as well as 
any year-end central government fiscal surplus; the closing balance of FEIREP; and the 
account’s investment revenues. 
The CEREPS funds are prohibited from use for current spending, and are to be 
distributed as follows:  
(i)  35 percent for four alternative uses: (a) credit lines at below-market interest rates to 
finance productive projects for agriculture, industry, fishing, small business, and micro 
enterprises, through first and second-tier operations by two state-controlled development banks 
(the Corporación Financiera Nacional, CFN, and the Banco Nacional de Fomento, BNF), with 
some constraints related to the beneficiaries’ creditworthiness; (b) the payment of longstanding 
debts to the Social Security Agency; (c) debt buyback operations on domestic and foreign public 
debt, with the understanding that the new funds released through these buybacks should be used 
for infrastructure investments, credits to the productive sector, and education, health, and 
housing; and (d) infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing competitiveness and productivity 
(with a ceiling of 10 percent of the total funds earmarked for this item). 
(ii) 30 percent for social investment projects, half in education and culture, and half in 
health and sanitation, both within the priorities of the Social Development Plan.  
(iii) 5 percent for research and development, in the form of research and technological 
projects through several specialized agencies and universities. 
(iv)    5 percent for road improvement and maintenance, through the Public Works 
Ministry. 
(v) 5 percent for environment and social projects to address negative externalities from 
hydrocarbons and state-controlled mining activities. 
(vi)   20 percent to stabilize oil revenues and address emergency situations.    11
 
II.4.  The Fund for Savings and Contingencies 
The law creating CEREPS also set up the Fund for Savings and Contingencies (FAC) as 
a trust fund collecting the funds for stabilizing oil revenues. The trust fund is to be managed by 
the Central Bank, and its resources can only be used for revenue stabilization and emergency 
spending. The fund has a ceiling of 2.5 percent of GDP for the relevant cumulative funds. In 
addition, all funds unused by year-end from CEREPS are automatically transferred to FAC. 
The FAC funds can be used to compensate any shortfall in budgeted oil revenues, for 
example as a result of declining international oil prices or smaller than expected production 
volumes. FAC can also be used for emergency spending, which has a rather lax definition. 
According to the Constitution, the President can declare an emergency state in part or all of the 
country, in case of an imminent external attack, war, natural disaster, or an acute internal 
upheaval. The emergency could affect some or all activities. The President must notify Congress 
of the state of emergency within 48 hours, and Congress can potentially revoke it. The state of 
emergency can last up to 60 days, and can subsequently be renewed or revoked.  
In practice, successive governments have used the state of emergency rather liberally. In 
recent years, and even more often in recent months, several decrees have declared an emergency 
in a wide array of sectors—electricity, jails, education, health, national roads, areas affected by a 
volcanic eruption, and the police—paving the way for channeling FAC (and potentially FEP and 
CEREPS) resources to finance spending in all those sectors. As a result, the initial FAC objective 
of being a genuine mechanism for stabilizing oil revenues and facing natural disasters has been 
largely diverted.  
 
II.5.  The Energy and Hydrocarbon Investment Fund 
The Energy and Hydrocarbon Investment Fund (FEISEH) is the most recent oil-related 
fund. It was created through a special law approved after the authorities decided in May 2006 to 
rescind the existing oil exploration contract with U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Co. (Oxy), 
following alleged breaches of the company’s contractual obligations.
7 The law, approved in 
                                                 
7 The alleged breaches of Oxy’s contractual obligations involved the transfer of 40 percent of its holdings in the 
country to Canada’s ENCANA without previous authorization. The decision meant that Oxy was legally obligated 
to return to the state its oil production field (known as “Bloque 15”) and related assets with no compensation. 
Subsequently, Oxy—until then the largest private oil producer in Ecuador, producing more than 100,000 barrels per   12
October 2006, channels to the FEISEH trust fund, administered by the Central Bank, all net oil 
revenues arising from the exploitation of the former Oxy’s fields—whether the production is 
used for crude oil exports or any alternative use and for any kind of exploitation options—and 
from the trust fund’s investment income. The fund’s resources, which will not flow through the 
FEP-CEREPS framework except for a specific provision, are earmarked for four uses: 
 
(i) CEREPS, 27 percent, in order to compensate it for the lost revenues it would have 
received if Oxy had continued to operate the Bloque 15 field.  
(ii) Reimbursement of Petroecuador’s operational and investment costs related to Bloque 
15 fields. 
(iii) Annual transfers to the budget for US$145m, to compensate for the loss of the 
income tax previously paid by Oxy. This transfer is, in turn, subject to partial earmarking 
to other entities, such as universities, in line with other laws. 
(iv) Investment projects in the electricity and hydrocarbon sectors. FEISEH is to be used 
to finance hydroelectric and alternative energy projects providing 2,300 MW in 
additional electricity generation capacity, as well as to expand existing oil and gas 
refining capacity (with the aim of processing all Petroecuador’s production except that 
arising from the Bloque 15 field), to expand and enhance oil derivatives and light crude 
oil pipelines, and to build LPG storage infrastructure. Once these objectives are met (with 
no specific preexisting ceiling), these funds should be channeled to FAC. 
(v) The trust fund’s operating costs and audit and overseeing costs for energy and 
hydrocarbon investments. 
(vi) A one-time US$70m allocation for microcredit financing or guarantees through state 
development banks (CFN and BNF).  
                                                                                                                                                             
day— presented a demand against Ecuador before the World Bank-affiliated International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) through an international arbitration procedure. The Ecuadorian authorities’ position is 
that Oxy failed to comply with Ecuadorian laws and its own contract, which explicitly give the state the right to 
rescind the contract in case of a sale of assets without prior authorization. Thus, they argue that the decision is a 
matter of national jurisdiction that should not be taken to international arbitration. While the process is ongoing, no 
proviso is included in FEISEH to cover potential legal liabilities.   13
Figure 2. Ecuador – The Use of Oil Revenues 
  Oil revenues
Heavy Crude Oil  Light Crude Oil 
Petroecuador Operating Costs 
(Including Budgeted Subsidies) 
Petroecuador Traditional Fields 
& Participation in Private 
Company Operations 
Bloque 15 Field (former 
Oxy field) 
 
Petroecuador Fields & Participation 
in Private Company Operations 
FEISE CERE
Oil Price > Budgeted Price  





Education & Health (30%) 
Debt Management & Credits for 
Productive Investments (35%) 
Environment, Infrastructure and 
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FAC (20% + CEREPS unused 
resources at year-end) 
Operating Costs & Field 
Investments
Investments in Energy & Oil
Projects **
CEREPS (27%) 



















In-Budget Beneficiaries (Foviagro, 
Fonasa, Fonador, Health & Labor 
Ministries, Housing & Agricultural 
Banks, INNFA, IECE, Central 
Bank, Universities & Polytechnic 
Schools, Esmeraldas Province) 











*  FEP can compensate Petroecuador for oil derivative import costs beyond 
budgeted levels.  
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II.6.  Other Earmarking of Oil Revenues 
In addition to the funds reviewed in the previous sections, Ecuador’s oil revenues are 
subject to a number of legally mandated earmarking provisions. As presented in Figure 2, oil 
proceeds are thus subject to a highly complex system of distribution, including the oil funds 
detailed above.   
 
Petroecuador’s Operating Costs  
Oil revenues are used to compensate Petroecuador for its operating costs. However, a 
few important caveats apply:   
•  The financing of Petroecuador’s new investments is subject to political 
considerations and arbitration by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. As a result of the 
tendency to give priority to current spending to appease social tensions and yield to lobbying 
by special interest groups, successive governments, in recent years and amid large political 
instability, have tended to relegate investments in the oil sector. Thus, Petroecuador has 
received limited funds for investments in the sector. Combined with large inefficiencies at the 
company level coupled with corruption, this has resulted in a downward production trend of 
oil production by the state company for 11 years in a row. In recent years, as presented in 
Figure 3, this trend has contrasted with the increased production of private companies, 
reflecting the much larger amounts that private companies channel for new investments and 
maintenance of oil fields. The only exception to this trend was the decision to rescind Oxy’s 
contract, which resulted in May 2006 in a one-off transfer of a production field from a private 
company to Petroecuador.   15
 
Figure 3. Oil Production by Petroecuador and Private Companies 
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•  The growing financing needs to cover large subsidies for oil derivative 
products have resulted in large costs for Petroecuador, which needs to import costly 
derivatives to be sold in the domestic market at subsidized prices. Meanwhile, domestic 
demand for oil derivatives has been increasing rapidly, reflecting distorted relative prices, 
significant smuggling activity to border countries where prices are much higher (LPG prices 
in Colombia and Peru are about ten times larger), and growing demand for diesel for electric 
generation purposes.
8  
                                                 
8 Ecuador’s electricity sector also suffers from large inefficiencies and capacity shortages, as a result of under-
investment in hydroelectric plants and increased reliance on more costly thermoelectric generation or imports. 
Thus, Ecuador has the questionable particularity of having rather high final electricity costs by regional 
standards despite subsidizing those prices. The inefficiencies of distribution utilities—plagued by political 
influences, inefficiencies, and conflicts of interest in their management—have in turn resulted in low incentives 
for private investment in new plants, particularly hydroelectric ones that require large investments and have a 
long cost recovery period.   16
 
Table 1. Explicit and Implicit Subsidies for Oil Derivative Products 
(US$ millions and percentage of GDP) 
 
Net direct import costs
Diesel
High-quality 
gasoline LPG Total % GDP
2003 -13.0                   -58.5                   107.7                  36.2                    0.1%
2004 71.8                    -0.3                     203.5                  275.0                  0.8%
2005 318.3                  117.9                  293.5                  729.7                  2.0%
2006 499.9                  183.4                  390.7                  1,074.0               2.6%
Net direct import costs + opportunity costs
Diesel
High-quality 
gasoline LPG Total % GDP
2003 -39.2                   -153.1                 146.9                  -45.5                   -0.2%
2004 245.3                  -0.8                     272.1                  516.7                  1.6%
2005 833.4                  268.9                  370.3                  1,472.6               4.0%
2006 1,025.0               444.6                  492.3                  1,962.0               4.8%  
 
Source: Petroecuador, Central Bank of Ecuador, and author’s estimates. 
 
Oil derivative subsidies can be estimated both by the net explicit costs related to oil 
derivative imports and by opportunity costs, as Petroecuador uses its own oil production to 
refine derivatives to be sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market. As detailed in Table 
1 and Figure 4, such subsidies have drastically grown in recent years with rising oil prices. 
Explicit subsidies reached 2 to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2005-06, while total (explicit and 
implicit) subsidies totaled 4 to 4.8 percent of GDP. Barring any political decisions, the latter 
could represent about 5.3 to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2007, according to estimates by the 
Ministry of Economics and the Central Bank of Ecuador for the 2007 budget. 
From a fiscal stabilization perspective, in the short run, oil subsidies imply some 
automatic counter-cyclical patterns: they tend to increase when oil prices are boosting fiscal 
revenues and to decrease when the government receives smaller oil-related inflows. 
However, this type of automatic fiscal stabilizing mechanism is highly inefficient for various 
reasons. First, several studies have shown that generalized subsidies are highly regressive.
9 
Therefore, counter-cyclical fiscal policy does not achieve its objective to protect public 
expenditure items that are critical for medium-term growth and poverty reduction. 
Montenegro (2006) notes that the large amounts needed to finance such subsidies are one of 
                                                 
9 About 85 percent of gas and diesel subsidies benefit the richest quintile of the population, while the LPG 
subsidy benefits the richest quintile five times more than the poorest quintile; see SIISE-STFS (2003) and WB-
IDB (2004).   17
the reasons explaining the weak investment levels of Petroecuador in recent years. In turn, 
this has resulted in reduced oil production levels by the state oil company, thus affecting the 
country’s potential output and future fiscal revenues.
10 Finally, large subsidies have fueled 
the growth of smuggling of oil derivatives (particularly diesel and LPG) to neighboring 
countries as well as dynamic demand trends, which may somehow attenuate the direct 
counter-cyclical impact. 
 
Figure 4. Net Import Costs of Oil Derivative Subsidies 















Source: Petroecuador and Central Bank of Ecuador. 
 
•  The growing cost of oil subsidies has also implied the need for more creative 
ways to finance them. Petroecuador usually deducts these import costs from the revenues 
arising from the domestic sale of oil derivatives, before transferring the net amount to the 
budget. This explains, among other things, why the budget revenues from the sale of oil 
derivatives have not shown an upward trend in recent years, in opposition to oil export 
revenues. However, rising costs have led to a situation where net direct import costs have 
become larger than budgeted revenues from oil derivative sales. Thus, the state has had to 
devise alternatives to cover such costs. This has been done either by withdrawing funds from 
the FEP-to-be-liquidated account, in advance of FEP’s year-end liquidation, or by using FAC 
funds to finance Petroecuador sales of diesel and other derivatives to thermoelectric 
generation plants. Such a move has been justified by the emergency status of the electricity 
sector, granted through successive Presidential Decrees (with the aim of avoiding blackouts), 
which paved the way for the use of the FAC funds. 
                                                 
10 In addition to Montenegro (2006), see Albornoz, Cueva, and Gordillo (2006) for a discussion of oil sector 
prospects and challenges.   18





State Share from 
Private Companies 
(Light Crude Oil)











Distribution based on the FOB export price
Petroecuador Petroecuador's Net Cost Recovery
Defense Board 8% 8%
CORPEI
0.05% of FOB 
export value
…
0.05% of FOB 
export value
FEP-to-be-liquidated FEP provision 1/ … FEP provision 1/ …… …
ECODESARROLLO
50 cts per exported 
barrel
50 cts per exported 
barrel
Services Provision Companies Investments recovery
Esmeraldas, Napo & Sucumbíos 
Provinces
$0.005 per barrel
Development Fund for the Amazonian 
Region
Share of services to 
Petroecuador 2/
Central Government Income Tax
Pipeline tariffs
In-Budget distribution
Oil Investment Budget 10% 10% 10%
Treasury Unique Account 89.73% 89.91%
90% (first 5 
months) & 22.24% 
(from the 6th month 
onwards)
100%
FOVIAGRO 0.06% 0.06% 0.07%
FONASA 0.02% 0.02% 0.03%
FONAFOR 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Other Beneficiaries 3/ 0.18%
CEREPS 100%
BCE-MEF Trust Fund for Companies' 
Cost Recovery
67.76% from 6th 
month onwards





Participation over incremental export revenues
CORPECUADOR 10% of Treasury's participation over incremental export income …
1/ Actual minus budgeted oil price times number of barrels.
2/ 2.5% for national companies and 4.5% for foreign companies on services provided to Petroecuador.
3/ Health & Labor Ministries, BEDE, FODESEC, Esmeraldas Provincial Council, BEV, INNFA, IECE, BCE, BNF, Public and Private Universities & Polytechnic Schools.  
  Source: Central Bank of Ecuador (2006) and Artola and Pazmiño (2007).   19





State Share from 
Private Companies 
(Light Crude Oil)
State Share from 
Private Companies 
(Heavy Crude Oil)
  Distribution based on the FOB export price
Petroecuador Petreocuador's Net Cost Recovery
Defense Board
CORPEI 0.05% of FOB export value …
FEP-to-be-liquidated FEP provision 1/ …
ECODESARROLLO
50 cts per exported 
barrel
Services Provision Companies
Esmeraldas, Napo & 
Sucumbíos Provinces
$0.005 per barrel …
Development Fund for the 
Amazonian Region
Central Government
Pipeline tariffs SOTE tariff (90% for the Treasury & 10% for PIP) …
 In-Budget  distribution
Oil Investment Budget






BCE-MEF Trust Fund for 
Companies' Cost Recovery





  Participation over incremental export revenues
CORPECUADOR  
  Source: Central Bank of Ecuador (2006) and Artola and Pazmiño (2007).   20
Earmarking Oil Funds to Diverse Entities 
 
Once Petroecuador’s deductions for operational costs are made, oil revenues are 
subject to earmarking to both off-budget and in-budget beneficiaries, as detailed in Tables 2 
and 3.  
Off-budget spending implies the transfer of funds to public and, in some cases, private 
entities before the money is allocated for budgetary purposes. Such entities include, for 
example, the Defense Board (for military expenditures), Amazonian oil-producing provinces, 
or CORPEI, an agency in charge of export promotion and foreign investment attraction. Their 
budgets are excluded from the General Budget, thus limiting transparency in the use of funds 
for the general public.   
In-budget expenditure is subject to a somewhat increased level of public 
accountability through the budgetary process. However, once the funds are allocated to the 
budget, the legal provisions imply the need to specifically include spending for those entities. 
This kind of revenue earmarking is common in Ecuador, both for oil and non-oil revenues, 
and has limited the margin for budget flexibility.
11  
The legal provisions regarding earmarking vary with the type of contract and the type 
of crude oil involved: 
•  Light crude oil revenues within the budget limits are used for earmarking 
beneficiaries and the budget. 
•  Light crude oil revenues beyond the budget limits go to the FEP-to-be-
liquidated account, which is partly used for spending throughout the year and is subject to a 
year-end liquidation procedure. 
•  Heavy crude oil revenues come from Petroecuador’s traditional fields and its 
participation in various oil contracts with private companies. It is also subject to off-budget 
earmarking for Ecodesarrollo (an Amazonian development fund, channeled through local 
governments), before going to CEREPS, which is then subject to withdrawals throughout the 
year for its intended uses. 
 
                                                 
11 Several studies have estimated that budget flexibility—the percentage of budget revenues that can be 
modified in the short run to reflect the government’s policy priorities, taking into account the earmarking of oil 
and non-oil revenues and expenditure, the short-run inflexibility for several categories of spending—is very 
limited, in the range of 2 to 8 percent; see World Bank-IDB (2004); Almeida, Gallardo, and Tomaselli (2005); 
and Cueva (2006). See Alier (2007) for a discussion of budget rigidities in Latin American countries.   21
•  Heavy crude oil revenues arising from the Bloque 15 (former Oxy) field also 
go to off-budget beneficiaries and FEISEH, which in turn partially funds the budget and in-
budget beneficiaries. 
•  Reforms of the Hydrocarbon Law approved in 2006 increased the 
government’s take in hydrocarbon revenues. The legal changes were aimed at addressing the 
previous lack of provisions in several existing oil contracts. The reforms adjusted the 
government’s participation in oil revenues in case of high oil prices, despite opposition from 
private companies because they considered that such a move was a unilateral change in their 
contracts. The reforms granted the state a 50 percent share of excess earnings, calculated by 
comparing the actual FOB price of Ecuadorian crude oil with the actual price at the time of 
the subscription of the individual oil contracts, with some adjustments for U.S. inflation and 
oil quality.
12 These resources are collected in a separate budgetary account. 
 
Overall, the existing legal arrangements for the use, earmarking, and saving of oil 
revenues in Ecuador are extremely complex, with many different rules on revenue 
earmarking, the type of beneficiaries, the constraints regarding the potential use of the 
different funds, the loose definitions regarding the specific situations when governments can 
make use of the funds, and the transparency requirements regarding the use of the money. 
This combination of intricate legal rules and procedures for channeling oil resources is 
clearly inefficient from a transparency perspective. In addition, the complexity makes it 
extremely difficult to develop an open discussion of public spending priorities and has 
imposed growing constraints on the central government’s cash management. 
 
III.  FISCAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
This section reviews fiscal developments in recent years in Ecuador, from the 
perspective of oil revenues and stabilization funds. To that end, it briefly reviews recent fiscal 
trends, before addressing the prospects for the oil industry and its potential impact on fiscal 
revenues, contingent fiscal costs, as well as the impact of oil derivative subsidies and their 
fiscal treatment. It includes some scenarios regarding oil revenues, expenditure, and the 
related evolution of stabilization funds. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Reforma a la Ley de Hidrocarburos, approved on April 19, 2006.   22
III.1.  A Growing Addiction to Oil Revenues 
Ecuador has benefited from a favorable international environment and high oil prices 
since the early 2000s. As a result, the economy has been growing faster than in the previous 
two decades, with greater oil and non-oil fiscal revenues. And greater income tax collection 
to a large extent reflects higher taxes from oil companies operating in the country. This has 
allowed the non-financial public sector balance to remain positive over the past six years, 
which in turn has led to a marked improvement in public debt indicators. The debt/GDP ratio 
fell from 86 percent by end-2000 to about 34 percent by end-2006.  
However, as presented in Table 4, the country’s fiscal indicators show a growing 
dependence on oil revenues, as witnessed by a sharp deterioration in non-oil public sector 
balances. On the revenue side, booming oil export revenues have increased, on average by a 
19 percent annual nominal growth rate during 2001-06 (although this growth rate is under-
estimated by the exclusion of the funds directed for oil derivative imports). Meanwhile, net 
income from the domestic sales of oil derivatives declined over the same period, reflecting 
the above-mentioned generalized subsidies on the final prices of oil derivatives. As non-oil 
revenues have also seen a healthy 19 percent average annual nominal increase over the same 
timeframe, these trends have allowed a sustained increase in public spending. However, the 
composition of expenditure is largely tilted toward current outlays, despite a marked decline 
in interest payments, which in turn reflected the improvement in debt indicators. Over 2001-
06, while primary current spending had average nominal growth close to 23 percent 
(excluding oil subsidies), the corresponding nominal growth rate for capital expenditure was 
less than 7 percent.  
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Table 4. Non-Financial Public Sector Operations 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average Annual 
Nominal Growth
(% of GDP) (%)
Total revenues 23.3     25.5     24.1     25.1     25.1     27.5     17.8
Oil 6.4        5.6        5.8        6.5        6.1        7.9        19.1
Exports 4.5        3.9        3.8        5.0        5.8        7.9        27.6
Domestic derivative sales 1.9        1.7        2.0        1.5        0.2        -        -100.0
Non-oil 16.5      19.2      18.0      17.8      18.8      20.4      19.0
VAT 6.9        6.7        6.1        5.8        5.9        6.0        10.9
Excise 0.6        0.9        0.8        0.8        0.8        0.8        20.2
Income tax 2.5        2.4        2.6        2.7        3.2        3.6        21.9
Tariffs 1.7        1.7        1.4        1.4        1.5        1.6        12.5
Scial Security contributions 2.1        3.1        3.1        3.1        3.0        3.8        27.9
Other 2.6        4.4        4.0        4.0        4.2        4.6        27.9
Public enterprises operating surplus 0.5        0.8        0.3        0.7        0.2        (0.7)       -223.6
 Total expenditure  23.3     24.7     23.0     23.0     24.3     24.3     14.9
Current spending 16.7      18.4      17.9      18.0      19.3      19.5      17.7
Interest payments 4.7        3.4        2.9        2.4        2.2        2.2        -2.1
Wages 6.4        8.1        8.0        7.9        8.0        7.7        18.4
Goods & Services 2.7        3.6        3.3        3.2        3.1        3.7        21.0
Other 2.8        3.3        3.7        4.5        6.0        5.9        31.9
Capital spending 6.6        6.4        5.1        4.9        5.0        4.8        6.7
 Overall balance  0.0       0.8       1.6       2.1       0.7       3.3      
Memo items:
Non-oil balance -4.5 -3.1 -2.2 -2.9 -5.1 -4.6
Primary balance 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.5 2.9 5.5
Non-oil primary balance -1.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.9 -3.1 -2.4
Primary spending 18.6 21.4 20.1 20.5 22.1 22.1 23.0  
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
 
Another way to look at these figures is to consider the prudential fiscal rules 
introduced by the Fiscal Responsibility Law in June 2002, and subsequently amended in July 
2005. Although the law calls for a 3.5 percent ceiling on the annual real growth of primary 
current spending, the actual trends show a 6.6 percent real growth increase during 2003-06. 
Such inconsistency between the legal objectives and the actual performance can be explained, 
as the law is only applicable to the proposed budget (and even then, the law is unclear as to 
which should be the comparative previous-year budget to be used as the reference: the 
previous proposed budget, the mid-year revised budget, or the implemented one). The law 
includes no proviso to extend to the implemented budget throughout the year the applicability 
of prudential limits, which have been repeatedly breached. 
   24
In summary, the salient features from these fiscal trends include the following:  
 
(i)  Current spending shows dynamic trends, most likely at unsustainable levels for 
the medium term, with the risk that such spending is hardly reversible in case of a potential 
shock. 
(ii) Such trends are further aggravated by the decision to maintain the prices of oil 
derivatives frozen, thus further deepening the regressivity of public spending.  
(iii) The fiscal dependence on oil revenues is growing in a worrisome trend, leaving 
the country’s fiscal accounts largely dependent on international oil price developments. 
(iv)    Capital spending has benefited only narrowly from the fiscal revenue boom, 
although infrastructure expenditure appears to be deeply needed in some areas, such as the 
electricity and hydrocarbon sectors. The increase in social spending has been mostly related 
to greater current expenditures. 
(v) Capital spending is badly prioritized, with weak assessments of its efficiency, and 
subject to continuous political economy considerations, which tend to favor groups with 
strong lobbying power instead of the most vulnerable ones. 
 
All in all, some of the intended features of oil stabilization schemes—including the 
need to boost public savings in good times, to prioritize capital spending encompassing high 
long-term returns, and to make room for anti-cyclical fiscal policies—appear to be at odds 
with actual fiscal trends in Ecuador. This suggests that the existing oil funds are not bearing 
all their intended fruits. 
 
III.2.  A Mounting Appetite for Using Growing Funds  
Meanwhile, the balances of the different oil-related funds have been boosted in recent 
years, reflecting the large increases in Ecuadorian crude oil prices. The creation of FEISEH in 
2006, funded with oil revenues from fields previously exploited by Oxy, explained a further 
increase in oil funds, which reached a combined balance of US$1.3bn as of end-2006, and 
US$1.7bn by end-January 2007.
13  
Figure 5 and Table 5 summarize the growing trends in oil funds, as well as annual 
inflows and outflows driving the evolution of the different funds. 
                                                 
13 In addition to the different oil funds, a special budgetary account is funded by the government’s additional 
take in hydrocarbon activities, resulting from the April 2006 reforms in the Hydrocarbon Law. The balance of 
the account, based on preliminary numbers, was US$152m by end-2006 and US$170m by January 2007.   25
Figure 5. Cumulative Gross Inflows and Year-End Stock of Oil Funds 



























Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and author’s calculations. 
Table 5. Inflows, Outflows, and Stocks of Oil-Related Funds 
(In US$ millions, preliminary data) 
Fund 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  Jan 07
FEP 1/ Beg-year stock -        100       -        12         5           109       22         0          
Inflows 252       223       40         79         295       355       458       522       29        
Outflows 252       123       126       66         302       251       545       544       -       
End-year stock -       100      14        12        5          109      22        0          29       
FEIREP 2/ Beg-year stock -        -        -       
Inflows 81         559       430      
Outflows 81         559       430      
End-year stock -       -       -      
CEREPS 3/ Beg-year stock -        185       231      
Inflows 643       1,010    226      
Outflows 459       964       282      
End-year stock 185      231      175     
FAC 3/ Beg-year stock -        129       411      
Inflows 129       426       275      
Outflows -        144       -       
End-year stock 129      411      686     
FEISEH 4/ Beg-year stock -        699      
Inflows 719       144      
Outflows 20         -       
End-year stock 699      842     
Total Beg-year stock -        -        100       -        12         5           109       336       1,341   
Inflows 252       223       40         79         375       914       1,660    2,677    674      
Outflows 252       123       126       66         382       810       1,433    1,672    282      
End-year stock -       100      14        12        5          109      336      1,341  1,733  
Memo: Special Account related to April 2006 Reforms to the Hydrocarbons Law 152       170      
1/ The FEP was modified in 2002 following a General Prosecutor's legal opinion; the existing stock was  
liquidated. Subsequent end-year stocks, subject to liquidation, may differ from zero, reflecting timing issues.
2/ Replaced by the CEREPS in July 2005; final stock liquidated.
3/ Created in July 2005.
4/ Created in October 2006.  
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Ministry of Economy, and Observatorio de la Política Fiscal.   26
 
Since 2002—following a legal opinion by the General Prosecutor—FEP is liquidated 
by year-end, although timing issues may explain non-zero balances. A similar pattern applied 
to FEIREP until July 2005, when it was liquidated and replaced by CEREPS, which has built 
up resources that—following the year-end closure—are transferred to FAC. Thus, FAC 
should be the main vehicle for building up future resources over successive years, as long as 
actual expenditures are not large enough to deplete it. Recent trends reveal a growing 
tendency to use them as umbrellas to cover diverse spending, made possible by the relatively 
loose definitions of the legally permitted expenditure. Both FEP and FAC were used in 2006 
to face the growing costs of oil derivative subsidies. CEREPS has financed health, education, 
and housing programs, and diverse emergency situations through FAC, although no clear 
assessment on the efficiency in the use of the funds is available. In addition, the practice of 
withdrawing funds from FEP-to-be-liquidated throughout the year could well lead to a final 
liquidation by year-end showing that withdrawn funds have gone beyond the actual year-end 
value, which has happened in the past. There is a need to ensure refunds for FEP in 
subsequent fiscal years. 
 
Considering the legal provisions for cross-transfers between the different funds and 
their ability to carry over resources over time, FEISEH must be distinguished from the other 
funds. Although 27 percent of its inflows are channeled to CEREPS and an annual US$145m 
is transferred to the budget to compensate for the lost income tax from Oxy, the rest of 
FEISEH resources are more clearly earmarked for specific investments in the energy and 
hydrocarbon sectors. These typically relate to long-term projects and must be approved by a 
specialized commission. FEISEH, created in October 2006, has so far registered only 
minimal outflows, because the implementation of administrative and legal procedures for 
making it fully operational has taken some time. Once these issues are addressed, it is likely 
that the fund will become depleted over time as it is used to finance a few large investment 
operations. The minimal use of FEISEH so far makes it difficult to assess its potential 
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Figure 6. Is Ecuador Saving Exceptional Oil Revenues? 
(Cumulative gross inflows and year-end stock of oil funds, in US$ millions) 
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  Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and author’s calculations. 
 
How much is Ecuador saving of the resources going into the funds? Figure 6 presents 
a rough estimate of cumulative total inflows (netting out cross-fund transfers).
14 By end-
2006, the country had already spent more than three-quarters of the cumulative fund inflows 
since 1999. In addition, the relatively larger savings observed in 2006 were mostly due to the 
above-mentioned limitations for using the recently-created FEISEH, which were expected to 
be addressed in 2007, further reducing the overall savings of exceptional oil revenues. All in 
all, Ecuador is using most of the extraordinary oil revenues and saving a limited share. 
The relation between the use of the proceeds of the different funds and the budget 
differs depending on the legal characteristics of the funds. On the one hand, FEP and 
CEREPS are channeled through the budget, provided the use of funds is in line with the 
legally defined objectives and beneficiaries. Besides specific institutions benefiting from the 
funds, the legal mandate for the sector distribution of resources is vague enough to provide 
leeway for a loose interpretation. In that sense, these funds, more than genuine fiscal 
stabilization mechanisms, are mainly vehicles to earmark revenues for specific purposes. 
Moreover, because the money is channeled through the budget, assessing how efficiently it 
has been used is difficult. This is both because of the lack of information to differentiate the 
use of such resources from other budget revenues, and a result of the more general 
                                                 
14 Information on actual cross-fund transfers is only available on a preliminary basis; subsequent revisions are 
expected, which should not modify the main thrust of the message.    28
weaknesses regarding budget transparency and the lack of a results-oriented budget. Policy 
recommendations should address these issues. 
On the other hand, FEISEH and FAC are trust funds, administered by the Central 
Bank, whereby the use of funds is more clearly defined. The use of such resources is 
separated from the budget accounts and reported separately. However, FAC is increasingly 
used for “emergency” situations, which can be loosely defined. This opens the way for fiscal 
expansion based on extraordinary revenues, provides financing for spending in highly diverse 
areas beyond the budgeted levels, and reduces FAC’s ability to act as a genuine fiscal 
stabilization mechanism. It is too early to assess the contribution of FEISEH to the country’s 
economic development, although the sector orientation of its investments brings at least the 
hope of addressing the obvious historical under-investment in those areas. 
 
III.3.  Future Inflows of Oil Funds 
What can be expected regarding prospects for the funds in the coming years? 
Projections for the oil-related funds can be made through 2010, based on some basic 
assumptions. The objective of such an exercise is not to obtain excessively precise 
projections—which in any case are dependent on variables that have shown large historical 
volatility—but to obtain reasonable magnitudes regarding the different funds’ expected future 
inflows. The main assumptions of the baseline scenario can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  International oil prices (for West Texas Intermediate crude, WTI) are assumed 
to follow the Annual Energy Outlook 2006 projections from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. The projections are based on a 
decline in average West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices from US$65.2 per barrel in 2006 
to US$55.6 per barrel in 2007 and a further gradual reduction to US$47.3 per barrel in 2010.  
•  The relative price differentials between the WTI, heavy, and light Ecuadorian 
crude, as well as oil derivatives are assumed to maintain their historical trends. 
•  The budgeted oil price (critical for FEP inflows from light crude production) is 
assumed to be maintained at the 2006 budget level of US$35 per barrel. 
•  The consumer prices of oil derivative products remain frozen, thus any 
changes in oil prices are absorbed by an increase or decrease in oil subsidies. 
•  Import volumes of oil derivatives maintain their historical trends.   29
•  Production volumes are projected independently for the different fields and oil 
contracts presented in Tables 2 and 3 (heavy and light crude oil production for Petroecuador 
fields,  Nororiente field, Bloque 15 field, private companies’ fields with participation 
contracts, operational alliances, service provision contracts, and the ESPOL contract).  
 
The projections are based on historical trends, either for the most recent year (2006) 
when trends have been broadly stable, or for the most recent four years (2002-05) when 
specificities of the contracts, projects, or new developments have led to a higher volatility in 
recent years for their specific production volumes. Regarding the former Oxy’s Bloque 15 
field, the assumptions reflect the expected trends by Petroecuador authorities as of mid-
March (when the company’s budget was approved). It was expected that the field’s 
production would recover to about 90,000 barrels a day in 2007 and to 110,000 barrels a day 
in 2009. 
In order to perform sensitivity analysis, a pessimistic scenario (whereby both 
production volumes and prices are 10 percent lower than the baseline) and an optimistic 
scenario (with higher prices than the baseline) have been modeled. The optimistic scenario is 
based on the Annual Energy Outlook 2007 projections from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), which imply a slight (2.4 percent) increase in the average WTI crude 
oil prices in 2007 (to US$66.7 per barrel), before gradually falling to US$57.5 per barrel in 
2010. WTI prices would thus be 16.5 to 18.5 percent higher than the baseline. Although these 
EIA projections are more recent than those used for the baseline, the actual average WTI 
prices in January-February 2007 (at US$56.8 a barrel) appear to be closer to the baseline’s 
projections so far. The optimistic scenario does not include greater production volumes, both 
to allow an asymmetric view of the impact of changes in prices and/or volumes, and to reflect 
the challenges already faced to ensure the baseline’s projected volumes. 
 
   30
Table 6. Projected Trends for Oil-Related Funds 
(In US$ millions, inflows during each period) 
CEREPS FAC FEP FEISEH
Cost of Oil 
Subsidies
Gross Total 
1/ Net Total 2/
(Baseline Scenario)
2007 390                  97                    335                  1,006               945                  1,827               882                 
2008 363                  91                    232                  1,033               960                  1,719               759                 
2009 345                  86                    166                  1,087               1,013               1,684               672                 
2010 322                  81                    78                    1,013               1,005               1,494               489                 
(Pessimistic Scenario)
2007 315                  79                    140                  904                  741                  1,437               696                 
2008 293                  73                    58                    929                  730                  1,353               623                 
2009 279                  70                    5                      976                  748                  1,330               583                 
2010 261                  65                    -66                   911                  703                  1,170               467                 
(Optimistic Scenario)
2007 484                  121                  692                  1,249               1,366               2,547               1,181              
2008 462                  116                  612                  1,317               1,499               2,507               1,008              
2009 436                  109                  512                  1,371               1,604               2,428               823                 
2010 407                  102                  404                  1,280               1,680               2,193               513                 
1/ Total inflows for the different funds, without considering the cost of oil subsidies.
2/ Total inflows for the different funds, assuming all the net cost of oil subsidies are netted out from the funds.
  Source: Petroecuador, Central Bank of Ecuador, EIA, and author’s calculations and projections. 
 
Table 7. Projected Trends for Oil Funds, Including Cross-Transfers 
(In US$ millions, inflows during each period after transfers to other funds) 
CEREPS FAC FEP 1/ FEISEH Total
(Baseline Scenario)
2007 828                  97                    167                  589                  1,682              
2008 758                  91                    116                  609                  1,574              
2009 722                  86                    83                    648                  1,539              
2010 635                  81                    39                    595                  1,349              
(Pessimistic Scenario)
2007 629                  79                    70                    515                  1,292              
2008 573                  73                    29                    533                  1,208              
2009 545                  70                    2                      568                  1,185              
2010 506                  65                    -33                   520                  1,058              
(Optimistic Scenario)
2007 1,168               121                  346                  767                  2,402              
2008 1,124               116                  306                  817                  2,362              
2009 1,062               109                  256                  856                  2,283              
2010 955                  102                  202                  789                  2,048              
1/ The negative FEP inflows in 2010 in the pessimistic scenario would result from a lower
 than budgeted actual oil prices.  
Source: Petroecuador, Central Bank of Ecuador, EIA, and author’s calculations and 
projections. 
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Table 6 presents the results, detailing the projected trends for each oil fund through 
2010 under the different scenarios, including gross annual expected inflows to the funds. The 
legal framework envisages some cross-transfers between the different funds (for example, 27 
percent of FEISEH revenues to be channeled to CEREPS; half of year-end liquidated FEP to 
be transferred to CEREPS; and US$145m annually to be transferred from FEISEH to the 
general budget). Table 7 displays the projections including such transfers.
15 In both cases, the 
results correspond to inflows to the funds, which can be expected to finance the legally 
envisaged expenditures or contingencies over time. As a result, the actual year-end stocks of 
the funds depend on the effective implementation of such expenditures. In addition, any other 
revenues (arising for example from investing the proceeds of the funds) are excluded. 
 
Some general comments can be made about these projections: 
•  The expected declining trends over time for international oil prices explain the 
gradually falling inflows for the funds. In the baseline scenario, the funds have total inflows 
of US$1.8bn in 2007 (about 4.2 percent of GDP), before declining to about US$1.5bn in 
2010 (2.8 percent of GDP). 
•  The alternative scenarios point to a larger sensitivity to prices than to volume 
changes. Total fund gross inflows would decrease to US$1.4bn in 2007 in the pessimistic 
scenario (with 10 percent lower prices and volumes); they would increase to US$2.5bn in the 
optimistic scenario (with 16.5 to 18.5 percent higher prices than in the baseline). 
•  The net costs of importing subsidized oil derivatives would absorb about 
US$0.9bn in the baseline scenario. In all cases, net import costs would be greater than 50 
percent of total gross inflows to the different funds. This proportion would grow to 67-77 
percent (depending on the scenario) in 2010, assuming that oil derivative final prices remain 
unchanged while oil-related revenues decline as the demand for oil derivatives is assumed to 
continue growing. 
•  Total oil derivative subsidies (including explicit net import costs and implicit 
opportunity costs) will likely be larger than the total gross inflows to the oil funds in 2007, 
even in the optimistic scenario. 
                                                 
15 Total inflows in Table 7 are lower than those in Table 6, as the law envisages a US$145m annual transfer 
from FEISEH to the general budget, in order to compensate the Treasury for the income tax revenues that were 
previously paid by Oxy.   32
•  FEISEH is, in all cases, the largest fund in terms of gross annual inflows.
16 
However, once cross-fund transfers are taken into account, CEREPS becomes the largest 
fund in terms of annual inflows available to finance legally permitted outlays.  
•  The year-end FEP transfers to CEREPS could be reduced if some of the 
revenues expected to fund FEP are diverted throughout the year to finance oil derivative 
subsidies, thus depleting FEP’s expected inflows.  
CEREPS’s unused funds by year-end would go to FAC, which could thus grow faster than 
projected. 
 
IV.  FISCAL STABILIZATION MECHANISMS: WEAKNESSES AND SUGGESTIONS 
This section takes a look at the existing fiscal stabilization mechanisms, to assess their 
weaknesses and limitations. It evaluates the existing prudential fiscal rules and their actual 
impact on fiscal policy, the budget implementation mechanisms, and existing bypasses and 
escape clauses from a fiscal responsibility perspective. It offers suggestions on potential 
changes to improve the existing fiscal stabilization mechanisms, taking into consideration 
Ecuador’s political economy as well as international experiences.  
 
IV.1.  Shortcomings of the Existing Funds and Arrangements 
 
The existing oil-related funds can be assessed from various perspectives: 
•  From a theoretical perspective, are oil stabilization funds desirable, or can they 
constitute second-best strategies? 
•  Are the funds achieving their objectives? Are they helping to address – or 
instead contributing to deepen – the problems related to an inflexible and non-transparent 
budgetary process? 
•  Are there political economy considerations behind the creation of so many 
diverse funds? 
•  How are the funds related to existing fiscal prudential rules? 
•  Are there sensible and politically viable alternatives to the existing funds? 
 
                                                 
16 The baseline projections for FEISEH inflows do not differ much from those projected by Galarza (2006) in a 
recent study, with some differences that can be largely explained by some specifics in the law, which was 
approved after the study was performed.   33
Oil stabilization funds (or, more generally, natural resource stabilization funds) have 
been deceptive in many countries, although they have been popular. Although they are 
expected to address the volatility or unpredictability of oil prices, or the desire to save part of 
the windfall revenues for the future or less favorable times, oil stabilization funds have rarely 
been able to fulfill those expectations. (See, for example, Davis et. al. 2001.) One of the most 
common reasons has been the frequent changes in the governing rules of the funds. 
Governments have usually been keen to use or direct these monies, or to gain more discretion 
in the use of the funds. 
Ecuador has not been an exception. In the four years after FEP was created in March 
2000, the government created five different funds. Of those, one subsequently disappeared, 
and the recent creation of FEISEH shows that such funds may remain fashionable. 
The presence of several funds and their interrelatedness provide evidence of the 
complexities introduced by such arrangements. There is a lack of clear and enforceable rules 
to prohibit the excessive use of discretion. 
 
•  Currently, one of the funds—FEP—is liquidated annually by year-end and 
feeds some other fund. Meanwhile, the use in advance of the expected year-end funds has 
become a rather usual mechanism for the central government to address short-term liquidity 
needs; 
•  Most of the funds are intended as a way to earmark resources for specific uses, 
particularly social and capital spending, rather than as savings or smoothing mechanisms. In 
fact, FAC is the only fund working, at least in principle, as a savings fund with the intended 
aim to stabilize fiscal oil revenues. However, the growing recourse to decrees declaring 
diverse sectors under “emergency” is distorting this objective. The other funds are mostly 
schemes to channel revenues for predetermined spending, with FEISEH being the most 
specific in terms of the kind of spending to be financed. 
•  The managing rules of the different funds have been changed on several 
occasions, effectively allowing the successive governments to exercise discretion regarding 
the use of the funds, thereby limiting their initial objective. 
•  The funds are part of a more complex scheme involving a large number or 
earmarking systems, which tend to render the whole budget process cumbersome, difficult to 
implement and understand, and less transparent. This leads to inefficient use of public sector 
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•  Ecuador has usually been characterized by vertical fiscal imbalance, whereby 
the central government repeatedly faces liquidity constraints while other entities within the 
non-financial public sector (particularly autonomous bodies and local governments) hold 
excess liquidity. This problem has been further deepened as a consequence of growing fiscal 
decentralization, where local governments have tended to receive additional revenues through 
enhanced earmarking but have not been allocated additional spending responsibilities. 
•  The large number of earmarking laws and regulations has been further 
exacerbated by the different oil funds. 
 
If these problems are recurrent, why have funds and other earmarking procedures 
been so popular? The main answer probably lies in the weaknesses of the existing budget 
process. On the one hand, the budget preparation process is made difficult as a result of the 
rigidities that significantly reduce the margin of maneuver of any government regarding the 
budget proposal. On the other hand, actual budget implementation gives the upper hand to the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. Intra-year budget modifications are common in Ecuador: 
since 2001, each year has seen between 1,100 and 2,000 modifications to the approved 
budget.  
The budget implementation process is subject to permanent lobbying from politically 
powerful groups aiming to obtain increased financing beyond the budgetary and legally 
mandated provisions.
17 Such extra-budgetary financing is obtained by reducing budget 
ceilings for other sectors, typically those lacking a strong political voice. This process 
essentially involves public investment rather than current spending. Generally, the winning 
sectors in the process are large cities and public infrastructure projects supported by powerful 
groups. The losing parties include social spending, which corresponds to projects in poor 
rural areas with reduced voice, and the capacity of several social ministries is limited. This 
hurts the medium-term effectiveness of social policies, which are subject to volatile financing 
flows. In addition, the excessive intra-annual changes to the budget are not clearly explained 
or made transparent, and external control or auditing is rather difficult. 
In this context, many actors have viewed earmarking as a way to protect their 
revenues from the risk of ending up losing resources in the highly discretionary budget 
implementation process. Hence, they have pushed for a proliferation of legal mandates to 
                                                 
17 For a larger discussion of political economy considerations around the budget process, see Mejía, Albornoz, 
and Araujo (2006) or Cueva (2006).   35
allocate earmarked oil and non-oil revenues to very diverse entities. Such trends imply 
several problems. First, an ever-growing share of the budget is predetermined by law or 
corresponds to expenditure that is highly inflexible, at least in the short run, thus making it 
increasingly difficult to use the budget as a tool for implementing the government’s policy 
priorities. Second, the central government must deal with repeated cash management 
challenges. Third, there is a pro-cyclical tendency for fiscal policy, as earmarked revenues 
tend to grow in good times and generate spending pressures when autonomous entities 
receive excess money. Fourth, inconsistency has developed between the revenue flows for an 
entity and its spending needs, which have no particular reason to coincide when the 
earmarked tax or source of revenue is completely independent of the entity’s public policy 
objective. This results in excess or inadequate financing for specific purposes, depending on 
the circumstances. 
Regarding budget transparency, the financial management system in place (through 
the  Sistema Integrado de Gestión Financiera) has several weaknesses. Its decentralized 
operations hamper the ability to comprehensively track budget implementation and provide 
early warning signals when spending trends are not in line with budgeted levels. There is no 
formal system for introducing results-oriented rules. Weak sector leadership of the relevant 
ministries or entities cannot define and implement the sector budgets in line with policy 
priorities. And the cash-management process is decentralized and ineffective, which results in 
some public institutions overflowing with liquidity and others (typically the Treasury) facing 
recurrent liquidity shortfalls covered by costly financing. The current expectation is to 
introduce a more efficient, centralized, and transparent system initially for the central 
government entities, which should be operational for the budget preparation process during 
2007 and for budget execution in 2008.  
Finally, there is little if any technical prioritization of public investment projects in 
terms of a true cost-benefit analysis, which would include parameters related to poverty 
reduction or satisfying basic needs. Public investment spending is typically modified 
frequently during budget execution to accommodate political pressures from large cities and 
politically strong constituencies. In addition, the institutional distribution of responsibilities 
regarding the approval and tracking of public investment remains somewhat unclear between 
the Planning and Finance Ministries. 
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IV.2. Policy  Recommendations 
 
Considering all the caveats and weakness associated with the existing oil funds and 
earmarking procedures, could enhanced funds help to establish reasonable medium-term 
fiscal policies? Ideally, the problems arising from the volatility, uncertainty, and future 
depletion of oil resources could be better solved by ensuring sound fiscal policy, which 
would include limiting expenditure in good times, so as to ensure a fiscal and indebtedness 
cushion for bad times. This could be helped through reasonable and enforceable fiscal 
responsibility rules. However, although Ecuador has enacted such rules, they have already 
been changed once. And the current government has announced its intention to support 
legislation to further weaken such rules and create more spending discretion. As a result, the 
political feasibility of tightening prudential rules may be limited. 
Some of the oil funds could potentially help in solving a few other problems facing 
Ecuador, at least as second-best strategies. First, the clear trend to engage in unsustainable 
spending growth trends in favorable times, particularly for current spending, has also resulted 
in under-investment in key sectors, such as hydrocarbons and energy. Although the best way 
to ensure efficient new investments in those sectors (including the role of private investment 
and the corresponding incentives) can be debated, postponing large investments in those 
sectors has meant significant costs for the country. Therefore, earmarking funds for such 
purposes could constitute a second-best option. 
Second, reducing earmarking should be a medium-term objective to provide fiscal 
policy with a deeper role. However, getting the different actors involved to accept reduced 
earmarking appears very difficult as long as the budgetary implementation process remains 
highly discretionary. Situating fiscal policy in a long-run context, with some explicit 
agreements to protect key social spending in good and bad times, would be a way to provide 
some assurance that abandoning earmarking may not be suicidal for some sectors. A Chilean-
style scheme with a structural fiscal target (corrected by the impact of the economic cycle) 
could be a reasonable medium-term objective that would be highly consistent with the new 
administration’s support for a stronger role for planning activities. 
Third, market mechanisms to hedge or insure against oil price volatility could be an 
option to explore. Existing funds could be helpful in reducing the relevant costs. 
Fourth, provided oil funds include strong accountability rules, they could end up 
helping to achieve better transparency practices in the budget. In any case, efforts to enhance   37
the transparency of the budgetary system and the use of oil funds should be strongly 
supported.  
Along these lines, a few policy recommendations may be useful. Some are more 
directly related to oil funds; others are directed to the budget process, which is an important 
tool for channeling oil revenues, including from some of the funds. Although fiscal prudential 
rules are critical for sound medium-term fiscal policies, reinforcing the existing ones could 
face strong resistance in the current environment where some proposals have already been 
suggested to weaken existing rules. However, some specific topics where progress could be 
made include: (i) introducing a much clearer and unambiguous definition of current and 
capital spending to be applied to existing fiscal rules, so that procedures cannot be 
manipulated to elude compliance with the prudential rules; (ii) insisting that the existing 
fiscal rules (or even modified ones) should apply to the actual budgetary implementation, and 
not only to the proposed budget, which would be consistent with stronger accountability rules 
for fiscal policies; and (iii) enhancing the technical capacity in Congress to track and assess 
the budget implementation process, which is currently very limited. 
The government should strengthen the planning and prioritization of public 
investment and social spending to be funded with oil revenues. Gradually moving toward a 
results-oriented budget, with clauses to protect social spending for the poor, could bode well 
for the new administration. Shifting budget policies toward a longer-term perspective in a 
multi-annual budget framework could thus be combined with some reduction in existing 
earmarking, including for oil revenues. In this case, political resistance may lie less within the 
central government than within autonomous entities. 
The existing oil funds are too many and too complex. An option might be to keep 
only two funds. One would earmark revenues for investments in key areas, such as the energy 
and hydrocarbon sectors and some well-defined and truly pro-poor social spending. The other 
would boost public savings, whose funds could be used for debt-management operations and 
to ensure stability in pro-poor social expenditure. The rules for the use of such funds should 
be clear and unambiguous, including for the cases where emergency spending can be 
financed. 
Rules to enhance transparency in the use of funds should be supported. A few 
alternatives include: (i) a greater role for civil society organizations and specialized bodies in 
the budgetary process; (ii) formally including the costs arising from oil derivative subsidies in 
the general budget, regardless of whether any political decision is made on the levels of such 
subsidies; (iii) stronger transparency rules for the attribution of public markets for large   38
investment projects financed from oil resources; and (iv) more formal rules for the 
accountability and assessment of efficiency in the use of the funds. 
Regarding budget transparency and results-oriented budgets, the government should 
take steps to increase public discussion and awareness of spending priorities and results. It 
should make clear and easily understandable overall budget objectives to be achieved from 
the use of public funds, for example in terms of education or health coverage rates, or the 
extension of new roads to be built. It should regulate the recurrent publication of budget 
execution information and budget modifications and their rationale. And public institutions 
should present assessments of their strengths and weaknesses for results-oriented budgets and 
the achievement of expected objectives.  
The expected process for enhancing and modernizing the financial management 
system, SIGMA, as well as the implementation of a centralized Treasury account at the 
central government level, should be supported. These would provide the government with a 
critical tool to better integrate planning and prioritization activities with the budget, as well as 
to track the implementation of the budget. This move, which may appear as a technicality on 
first sight, could prove to have a significant impact for an orderly and transparent budget 
process and to foster greater focus toward a results-oriented budget. In addition, it would help 
improve the quality, coverage, and opportunity of budget information. 
Efficiency in public spending would be improved by clearly defining procedures for 
sector ministries (particularly Education and Health) to have greater leadership in budget 
preparation and execution for all the public entities using public resources in their areas. And 
enhancing the accountability of several regional entities or bodies (FODESEC, CREA, CRM, 
CEDEGE), which receive significant public funds, including from oil revenues, would help 
in the assessment of Ecuador’s efficiency in using oil revenues. 
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